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1 INTRODUCTION 
The vision of society proclaimed by the 
Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 (Constitution) is an open 
democracy.  There are a number of 
aspects – angles – to that openness.  
Paradoxically, one of them is secrecy.  In 
the context of representative and 
participatory democracy, the debate 
over and consideration of the Protection 
of State Information Bill (often termed 
the “Secrecy” Bill or Act) up to its 
passage as an Act provided a true test 
for the post-apartheid South African 
democracy.1 It is 
1 Klaaren J, "The South African ‘Secrecy Act’: 
democracy put to the test" (2015) 48 Verfass 
Recht Übersee VRÜ 284–303.  I argued that the 
South African parliamentary oversight was not 
as well implemented as the German oversight 
and that there were as yet clumsy modes of 
incorporating elements of the national debate 
from the provincial and local levels into the 
National Council of Provinces (the second 
legislative chamber of Parliament). I also argued 
that terming South Africa a dominant democracy 
framework (a mode of analysis in comparative 
constitutional law akin to the category of one-
party States) was inferior to an analysis 
attending to the symbolic politics of 
transparency between the intelligence services 
and the media.  
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important to move beyond the balancing metaphor and to recognize that transparency 
and secrecy are not two concepts separate from each other. The insight that 
transparency and opacity are mutually implicated allows us to understand better how 
both are supported and nurtured within a constitutional democracy. 
   The Constitutional Court in the My Vote Counts case was faced with a question of 
what an open society might entail in practice – specifically, whether or not private 
funding to political parties ought to be disclosed publicly as part of implementing the 
right of access to information.  This article thus explores one particular angle of 
openness -- the meaning of constitutional authority to enforce the right of access to 
information.  
There are, of course, other angles of openness.  One is the social character of 
openness.  This quality is embodied in the concept of the open society2 as well as in the 
concept of an open university, a concept with a tradition in South Africa stemming from 
an important 1957 statement.3   As any contemporary observer of South African politics 
would be aware, this angle of openness clearly draws on the recent South African 
experience of the #FeesMustFall student movement.  In the last three months of 2015, 
this student movement succeeded in obtaining a zero per cent fee increase for higher 
education for the following year. The movement is arguably a significant political 
development that will have consequences both in the higher education sector and in 
broader national politics.  Moving beyond the open university tradition, further issues 
have arisen.  University administrations have engaged robust private security 
protection in ostensibly private spaces, albeit ones which function publicly. They have 
also obtained interdicts that bear comparison with the negative features of SLAPP 
(strategic litigation against public participation) suits.4  Another is a debate kicking off 
over the suitability of university governance and the value of academic autonomy in the 
context of political responsibility for transformation in the sector.5  There are both risks 
and opportunities in the current moment.  Perhaps balancing the risk that securitization 
may become the norm on campuses, there is an opportunity to put into place university 
protest policies that are both rights regarding and democracy furthering. 
 Another angle of openness is its character as an end, a political ideal.6  This 
differs from an open society and presumes, at a minimum, a condition of no political 
capture as a precondition for democracy.  This topic has become the subject of a 
2 Popper K The Open Society and Its Enemies (London and New York:  Routledge 2012); Soros G Open 
Society Reforming Global Capitalism Reconsidered (New York:  PublicAffairs 2000); Constitution s 36(1). 
3 University of Cape Town Academic Freedom Committee & University of the Witwatersrand Academic 
Freedom Committee The Open Universities and Academic Freedom, 1957-1974:  A Review (Cape Town:  
Juta 1974). 
4 Murombo T “SLAPP suits:  an emerging obstacle to public interest environmental litigation in South 
Africa” (2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1858642 (accessed 30 June 2016). 
5 “Council on Higher Education contradicts UCT, SAPTU on amendment bill", available at POLITY.ORG.ZA, 
http://www.polity.org.za/article/council-on-higher-education-contradicts-uct-saptu-on-amendment-bill-
2016-02-16 (last accessed 17 February 2016). 
6 Constitution 1.  
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growing literature, with works by Anthony Butler7 and Pierre de Vos8, discussing the 
relationship between funding and the operation of political parties in a democracy. In 
general, this literature upholds the value of institutional independence, in particular 
that of the Constitutional Court, without partaking of theories viewing South Africa as a 
democracy dominated by a single party.  This angle of openness is situated on the 
democratic side within the tradition of liberal-democratic constitutionalist concern 
about South African democracy.  In a recent example, Theunis Roux offers a 
functionalist analysis of the consolidation role played by the Constitutional Court in the 
last 20 years in South Africa.9  Contrasting his view with that of those pushing the Court 
to do more, Roux reads some significant Court decisions as safeguarding the Court’s 
own institutional role and thereby safeguarding constitutional democracy in the long 
term.10 
 The social character of openness may be integrated with the call to arms of 
openness as an ideal against political capture -- in other words how these two angles of 
openness could be aligned.  Heinz Klug has reviewed three monographs each advancing 
distinct fundamental theories of constitutional democracy.11  The third of the three 
scholars he reviews is Gary Jacobsohn, whose work focusses on the question of 
constitutional identity.12 It is intriguing that Jacobsohn’s theory may allow 
constitutional scholarship to bring into view the identity seeking character of the 2015 
South African student movements, both #FeesMustFall and #RhodesMustFall.13  In this 
theory, it is the identity formation over the long haul of a constitution that is key.  
Within such an identity may also lie the quality that is fundamental to the call for 
avoiding political capture, thus aligning these angles of openness.  On this note, I turn 
now to examine the Constitutional Court’s decision in the My Vote Counts case (“MVC 
case”).14 
2 ANGLING FOR OPENNESS:  MVC case 
The MVC case concerned the implementation of the constitutional right of access to 
information in South Africa’s democracy.  In my view, the majority judgment in the MVC 
7 Butler A Paying for politics:  party funding and political change in South Africa and the global South Jacana 
Media (2010). 
8 De Vos P "It’s my party (and I’ll do what I want to?):  internal party democracy and section 19 of the South 
African Constitution" (2015) 31 SAJHR 30–55. 
9 Roux T "Constitutional courts as democratic consolidators: insights from South Africa after 20 years", 
(2016) 42 J South Afr Stud 5–18. 
10 Roux T “The South African Constitutional Court’s democratic rights jurisprudence:  a response to Samuel 
Issacharoff” (2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2497777 (last accessed 13 October 
2014). 
11 Klug H “Constitutionalism, democracy and denial in post-apartheid South Africa (2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2141310 (last accessed 13 January 2016). 
12 Jacobsohn G Constitutional identity (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press 2010). 
13 Mbembe A "Decolonizing the university" Africa is a country, available at 
http://africasacountry.com/2015/06/decolonizing-the-university/ (last accessed 14 January 2016). 
14 My Vote Counts NPC v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others (CCT121/14) [2015] ZACC 31 (30 
September 2015). 
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case represents a lost opportunity to begin a respectful dialogue between the judiciary 
and the legislature about the shape and content of information security and disclosure 
laws.  A majority of justices rejected the claim of the applicant that Parliament had failed 
to fulfil a duty in terms of section 167(4)(e) to enact legislation giving effect to the right 
of access to information in relation to information held by political parties regarding 
their receipt of funding from private sources.15  The applicant’s claim depended on a 
reading of section 32 (the right of access to information) together with a reading of 
section 19 (the right to vote).  The majority judgment did not reach the issue of whether 
section 19 properly interpreted and read together with section 32(2) provide a right to 
information about private funding of political parties.  As the majority stated:  “Our 
approach makes it unnecessary for us to pronounce on whether information on the 
private funding of political parties is required for the exercise of the right to vote.”16 
The majority rested its rejection of the applicant’s claim on two points:  first, that 
to decide in favour of the applicant and to find such an obligation in section 167(4)(e) 
would violate the doctrine of the separation of powers; and secondly, in a more 
technical vein, that “the validity of PAIA is challenged and PAIA is the legislation 
envisaged in section 32(2), [so] the principle of subsidiarity applies … [and] the 
applicant ought to have challenged the constitutional validity of PAIA frontally in terms 
of section 172 of the Constitution in the High Court”.17 This article concentrates on the 
majority’s second point – the proper reasoning regarding the relationship of the validity 
of the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 (PAIA) and the interpretation of 
section 32(2) – and largely leaves aside general considerations of the doctrine of the 
separation of powers and their implications for the proper interpretation of section 167.  
It does so assuming that, on the first issue, a dialogic view of the doctrine of separation 
of powers is appropriate for the interpretation of section 32.18 
 In an apparently still relevant article published 20 years ago, I offered an 
interpretation of section 32(2) and the associated duty to pass legislation found in item 
23 of the transitional Schedule to the 1996 Constitution.  I argued that for 
“a decisive break from the constitutional culture of the past, it is necessary to take into account 
the institutional and structural relations between the various organs of state in order to 
provide a workable and democratic model of constitutional law.  The ‘give effect to’ clauses in 
the administrative justice and access to information rights are two good places to employ an 
institutional analysis and to allow both Parliament and the judiciary to play a role in 
constitutional interpretation”.19   
Under this kind of structural interpretive analysis, the MVC case is revealed as a 
democratic opportunity missed and the reasoning of the majority as flawed due to an 
incorrect implicit interpretation of the relationship of the validity of PAIA and the 
interpretation of section 32(2). 
15 At 121–195. 
16 At 124. 
17 At 122. 
18 Klaaren J Keynote address. Colloquium of the Constitutional Justice Project (2015) (on file with author). 
19 Klaaren J "Constitutional authority to enforce the rights of administrative justice and access to 
information" (1997) 13 SAJHR 549 564. 
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For this argument, two key texts from two decades back are important starting points:  
the still current text of the right of access to information in the 1996 Constitution and 
the transitional schedule that governed the transition to this right.  The text of section 
32 provides as follows:   
“(1) Everyone has the right of access to-(a) any information held by the state; and (b) any 
information that is held by another person and that is required for the exercise or protection of 
any rights. (2) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to this right, and may provide 
for reasonable measures to alleviate the administrative and financial burden on the state.”    
The transitional provision to be read with section 32 was in a Schedule at the back of 
the Constitution.  In Schedule 6 to the 1996 Constitution20, Item 23 Bill of Rights 
provides:   
“(1) National legislation envisaged in sections 9(4), 32(2) and 33(3) of the new Constitution 
must be enacted within three years of the date on which the new Constitution took effect.  … 
(3) Sections 32(2) and 33 (3) of the new Constitution lapse if the legislation envisaged in those 
sections, respectively, is not enacted within three years of the date the new Constitution took 
effect.” 
In relation to the validity of PAIA, the MVC case majority assumes an interpretation of 
section 32(2) as a clause requiring Parliament to cover the field of access to information 
with legislation giving effect to the right.  In other words, the implicit interpretation of 
section 32(2) is that the content of the right (indeed, the full content of that right) must 
have been enacted into one comprehensive piece of legislation as part of the original 
function of section 32(2).  The PAIA is sufficient and comprehensive.  Challenges to PAIA 
as being under-inclusive may well be brought on the basis of section 32, but such 
challenges should be understood as challenges to the substantive validity of PAIA.   
This assumed interpretation of the majority is not the best fit with the drafting 
history of the Constitution, as well as with the character and structure of South Africa’s 
constitutional democracy. I have offered a different interpretation.  One should best 
read section 32(2) in its original context read with Item 23 of Schedule 6 to provide for 
a once-off duty to pass information disclosure legislation of some type, and thereafter 
(once Item 23 has essentially fallen away) to continuously signal the degree of 
deference due to Parliament by the judiciary in reviewing Parliament’s legislative 
choices in enforcing the right of access to information.  In this view, with regard to the 
right of access to information and the right to just administrative action, the judiciary 
owes Parliament a degree of deference with regard to its legislative choices especially 
on the matter of appropriate institutional design (the enforcement mechanism) to give 
effect to the rights.21   
For the sake of argument, let us assume that the right to vote in section 19 read 
with section 32 does require that voters have access to information about private 
funding of political parties.  It may even be the case that section 32 on its own should be 
so interpreted.  It does not necessarily follow that section 32(2) read with Item 23 
20   See also Item 21 which provides:  “Where the new Constitution requires the enactment of national or 
provincial legislation, that legislation must be enacted by the relevant authority within a reasonable 
period of the date the new Constitution took effect.” 
21 Klaaren (1997). 
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required that Parliament enact PAIA in order to give effect to the full extent of the 
content of the right through a single piece of legislation comprehensively covering the 
content of the right, nor does it follow that section 32(2) read with section 167(4)(e) 
now require that PAIA be amended.  Instead of imposing such a rigid obligation to 
legislate and cover the field of access to information, section 32(2)’s give effect to clause 
should be read rather to grant power to and provide for a leading institutional design 
role for Parliament.22  As I will explore more fully below, a more flexible enforcement 
regime providing some place for common law doctrine and its development as well as 
provincial legislation and other elements is within the competence and discretion of 
Parliament in choosing how to implement the constitutional right of access to 
information. 
The problems of the majority may have started with the applicant.  In 
highlighting its understanding of the applicant’s case, the majority emphasizes that the 
applicant distinguishes between an access to information regime of proactive disclosure 
of party funding and a regime of once-off disclosure upon request.23  In the majority’s 
view, PAIA does the latter and the applicant has asked for the former – a statute 
providing for general and continuous disclosure of private funding sources by political 
parties as part of a comprehensive regulatory regime.  The applicant’s submission cited 
by the majority24 put its argument in the following terms:   
“The applicant's founding affidavit sets out the source and substance of the constitutional 
obligation to enact the lacking legislation. In short, the right of access to information held by 
political parties, which is required for the effective exercise of the right to vote, cannot be given 
effect to without the enactment of the lacking legislation. Section 32(2) of the Constitution thus 
imposes an obligation to enact such legislation.”25   
This was an overstatement and appears to have started the majority down the wrong 
track. 
The majority opinion in the MVC case does not fully explore or identify the 
source of the duty to enact PAIA in the first three years of the final Constitution.  A 
thought experiment was needed as to how the constitutional validity of PAIA might 
have been challenged on the basis of Item 23 of Schedule 6.  Such an exploration can 
lead to three important doctrinal conclusions regarding the source of the duty to enact 
legislation to enforce the right of access to information, the character of the legislative 
scheme enforcing the right as partial or comprehensive, and the proper format and 
forum to challenge the existing legislative scheme.  The remainder of this section 
discusses these three points. 
 
22   The rigidity of the assumed interpretation may underlie an apparent degree of ambiguity regarding 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court.  In para 121, the majority opinion states that it agrees that the 
Constitutional Court has exclusive jurisdiction over the applicant’s claim (but cf para 190).  This fuzziness 
over exclusive jurisdiction is one doctrinal location of dispute between the minority and the majority. 
23 MVC case 126 & 128. 
24 MVC case 190. 
25 Applicant’s written argument:  My Vote Counts NPC v Speaker, National Assembly 9 (2014) available at 
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/Archimages/22429.PDF (last accessed 17 February 2016). 
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2.1 The Source of the Duty to Enact Legislation Enforcing the Right 
At the time of PAIA’s passage, the source of the duty for its passage was Item 23(1) of 
Schedule 6 read with section 32.  The source was not section 32(2) on its own.  Read 
with Parliament’s obligation to comply with constitutional duties placed on it, this 
indeed was a duty on Parliament.  Parliament satisfied that duty two decades ago by 
passing PAIA within Item 23’s required timeline -- albeit just in time.  A procedural test 
was appropriate for judging compliance with this duty and Parliament’s action in 
enacting PAIA passes that test.  The PAIA is the legislation envisaged in Item 23(1) of 
Schedule 6 read with section 32.26  The majority rightly contends that it is incorrect – in 
its terms “ludicrous” -- to contend that PAIA is not the legislation envisioned in section 
32(2) and enacted within three years of the passage of the 1996 Constitution.  
2.2 The character of the legislative scheme enforcing the right as partial or 
comprehensive 
However, in the majority’s implicit interpretation of section 32(2) read with the 
principle of subsidiarity, there is only one relevant piece of legislation, PAIA, for 
enforcement of the right of access to information.  This interpretation of section 32(2) 
as requiring comprehensive legislation is incorrect.  The PAIA is national legislation 
envisaged in section 32(2).  However, it is not the only legislation envisaged in section 
32(2).   On a proper interpretation, PAIA is one of what one can regard as a number of 
openness-enforcing statutes.  As PAIA itself recognizes, statutes other than PAIA give 
effect to and may be measured against the content of the section 32 right of access to 
information. 
A substantial part of the MVC case majority’s reasoning that PAIA is 
comprehensive legislation giving effect to section 32 is by analogy with the Promotion 
of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA).27  There is however a much stronger 
argument for the exclusivity and comprehensiveness of PAJA than there is for PAIA.  
Both PAJA and PAIA are statutes that provide enforcement mechanisms for a 
constitutional right.  Still, neither the enforcement mechanisms chosen by Parliament 
nor the constitutional structures within which those enforcement mechanisms operate 
are the same.   
The PAJA provides – in section 6 of that Act -- for judicial review as its central 
enforcement mechanism.  The PAJA also lays down some other rules of procedural 
fairness addressed, it would seem, to a bureaucratic and executive audience as well as 
to the public at large.  The PAIA provides for its central enforcement mechanisms in the 
shape of a request for records made to an organ of state in most cases. The PAIA also 
lays down some other rules of disclosure/non-disclosure such as, proactive publication 
requirements and an interim duty of confidentiality pending the enactment of privacy 
legislation.  The similarity between PAJA and PAIA is in their character as rights 
enforcing statutes and in the Parliamentary provision of a specific central remedial 
26 Klaaren (1997). 
27 MVC case 136–149. 
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mechanism to each of those pieces of legislation  -- judicial review in PAJA and a regime 
of disclosure upon request in PAIA.  Yet these enforcement mechanisms are clearly 
different.  Judicial review depends upon an existing institution – the courts – and lends 
itself more towards an interpretation as comprehensive and covering its field than does 
the enforcement mechanism of a request between parties for access to information. 
Beyond the difference in central enforcement mechanisms, there is a further 
significant difference between PAJA and PAIA -- the constitutional structure alongside 
which these enforcement mechanisms operate.  While PAJA has an associated 
constitutional structure, PAIA does not.  The constitutional mandate that there be one 
system of law and courts for judicial review28 arguably leads directly to the 
jurisprudence requiring PAJA to be used in priority over the principle of legality.29  By 
contrast, the Constitution prescribes no integrated institutional system for enforcement 
of the right of access to information.30   
2.3 What are the proper format and forum for a challenge to existing legislation 
enforcing the right? 
Since the Court is clear and correct in noting that the procedural step of timely 
enactment of legislation enforcing the right of access to information was validly taken 
two decades ago, it is apparently a substantive test of validity that the majority is 
imagining will take place in the High Court in terms of the case that it says the applicant 
should have brought.  As the majority puts it in its conclusion: 
“Although the application falls under this Court’s exclusive jurisdiction, PAIA is the legislation 
envisaged in section 32(2) of the Constitution.  The applicant has not challenged it frontally for 
being constitutionally invalid.  In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, it ought to have 
done so as that principle is applicable to this application.  The application must fail.”31 
The majority thus appears to be looking towards a constitutional challenge to PAIA for 
unduly restricting the exercise of the right in that PAIA has enacted a request 
mechanism.  If so, that is a challenge to the constitutional validity of PAIA that 
encompasses an interpretation of section 32(2).  There are a number of avenues such a 
challenge could take – the variety and assessment of which lie beyond the scope of this 
article.  For instance, is the request limitation constitutional or not?32   
28 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa and another: In re Ex parte President of the 
Republic of South Africa and others (CCT31/99) [2000] ZACC 1; 2000 (2) SA 674; 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (25 
February 2000). 
29 State Information Technology Agency Soc Ltd v Gijima Holdings (Pty) Ltd (641/2015) [2016] ZASCA 143; 
[2016] 4 All SA 842 (SCA) (30 September 2016). 
30 Klaaren J "Structures of government in the 1996 South African Constitution: putting democracy back 
into human rights" (1997) 13 SAJHR 3–27. 
31 MVC case 193. 
32 Currie I & Klaaren J The Promotion of Access to Information Act Commentary (Cape Town:  SiberInk 
2002).  Such a challenge to the enforcement mechanism chosen by Parliament in PAIA is quite different to 
a challenge that says the enforcement mechanism chosen should be extended to a category of information 
held by particular legal persons.  This scope challenge falls somewhat in-between the clear realms of a 
enforcement mechanism and the content of the right.  While opinions might differ on this point, Currie 
and I have termed such a challenge effectively a challenge to the content of the right.  Thus, Parliament 
would receive no special deference in such a case. 
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The majority’s requirement for the applicants to go to court and start in the High Court 
and its interpretation of the give effect to clause in section 32 both do little to promote 
institutional dialogue nor to invite Parliament into a discussion with the judiciary over 
the policy area of information disclosure.  The development of South Africa’s regime 
regarding political party funding would not be well served by an approach to the High 
Court with some sort of mini-certification claim against the substantive validity of PAIA 
as suggested by the majority.  More helpful would be reasoning regarding section 19 
read with section 32.  With the content of the right outlined and with the understanding 
of PAIA as the central but non-exclusive legislation in the legislative scheme giving 
effect to the right of access to information, Parliament and other institutions of South 
Africa’s constitutional democracy could work on further giving effect to that right.  
Indeed, during the writing and publishing of this article, Parliament has begun 
consideration of legislation reforming party funding. 
3 THE (OPEN AND DEMOCRATIC) WAY FORWARD 
In the Part above, I have claimed that the MVC case majority was incorrect in too quickly 
adopting an interpretation of section 32(2) as mandating the passage and maintenance 
of a field-covering and exclusive piece of national legislation in order to give effect to the 
right.  In this, the majority possibly understandably reasoned from PAJA jurisprudence.  
While such a choice may be appropriate with respect to the mandated exclusive judicial 
review mechanism of PAJA in part for reasons of constitutional structure, such a choice 
would not be appropriate in the field of access to information where Parliament has 
made a different choice.  It does not make good institutional and pragmatic sense that 
disclosure of information occurs only through a request for information made in terms 
of PAIA; and the Constitution mandates no structure – such as the courts – to underpin 
such a rule. 
The constitutional regime around enforcing the right of access to information is 
actually more nuanced and flexible than the majority gives it credit in this case.  Given 
its importance as a precondition for democracy, it is worth elaborating these 
flexibilities, which this Part attempts to do.  The same is true for the principle of 
subsidiarity, although even an outline of its nuances and flexibilities must wait for a 
revision and may be beyond the scope of this article, which focusses on the political 
context for giving effect to the right to information as a precondition for democracy.33  
There are at least two other avenues that could satisfy section 32(2) without placing the 
contended for duty on Parliament, even assuming that the right to vote does require 
that voters have access to information about private funding of political parties.  One 
avenue is that of horizontal application.  The other avenue is that of enforcement of the 
right through provincial legislation. 
33 Klare K "Legal subsidiarity and constitutional rights: a reply to AJ van der Walt" 1 Cons. Court Rev 129–
154 (2008); Michelman F "Expropriation, eviction, and the dignity of the common law" (2012), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2116643 (last accessed 17 February 2016); Van der Walt, AJ 
"Normative pluralism and anarchy: reflections on the 2007 Term" 1 Const Court Rev 77–128 (2008). 
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Let us explore the first avenue of horizontal application.  To do so takes us back to the 
days of certification when it was a commonplace to note that section 32 was a chief 
textual location confirming the horizontal application of rights in the Bill of Rights.  To 
do so also conforms with a sense of the moral force of the argument in favour of 
disclosure – in order to make a political choice some information about one legal person 
– a political party -- needs to be disclosed to another legal person -- an individual voter.  
Understanding the obligation as horizontal might allow for development of some legal 
doctrines facilitating disclosure of sources of political party funding.  For instance, 
assume that a political party voluntarily discloses its sources of funding, even where 
such funding has been made the subject of a confidentiality agreement.  The horizontal 
obligation in terms of section 32 (2) might be raised as a defence against a contractual 
or delictual action for breach of confidence. 
Of course, this horizontal application avenue could also lead by a direct route to a 
scenario quite close to that envisioned by the majority as the next step.  A PAIA 
application to a political party refused by that political party on the grounds that there 
was no right to be exercised between the applicant and that political party (a provision 
of PAIA distinct from the substantive grounds for refusals, such as privacy, commercial 
confidentiality, etc.) can be taken on review to the High Court on the grounds that 
section 19 read with section 32 properly interpreted does contain such a right.  This 
scenario would present a frontal challenge not to PAIA but to the category of denials 
made by political parties to PAIA requests and thus to the parties’ interpretation of 
PAIA.  One can imagine how this might even be the subject of a class action. 
Let us next explore a second avenue of enforcement of a constitutional obligation 
to disclose private funding of political parties:  enforcement through provincial 
legislation.  South Africa already has legislation in various provinces that comes very 
close to, if not falling squarely within, this avenue.  As of 2014, it appeared that six 
provinces had followed the lead of the Gauteng Provincial Legislature, which first 
passed legislation authorizing allocation of provincial funds to political parties in its 
Gauteng Political Party Fund Act 3 of 2007.34  The Western Cape has not passed such 
legislation while the Eastern Cape did so but has since repealed its law.  These seven 
provincial laws currently funnel some R250m to political parties, about twice as much 
as is allocated under the national legislation. Doubts have been voiced regarding the 
constitutionality of these laws, but none has yet been challenged in court.  So why not 
condition the provincial funding of political parties on the disclosure of private sources 
of party funding?  There would seem to be no constitutional impediment to a provincial 
legislature requiring such disclosure. Indeed, should such a condition be 
constitutionally challenged as beyond its competence, section 32(2) would provide a 
substantive defence. In a constitutional democracy, a provincial legislature can and 
should pass legislation to facilitate the enforcement of constitutional rights and section 
34 Solik G "Resources:  State and Private -- Use or Abuse?  Unregulated Private Funding of Political Parties:  
Linking Money, Power, and Corruption, Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa:  South 
African Election Updates:  Issue Five" (2014), available at 
https://www.eisa.org.za/eu/2014eu5editorial.htm (last accessed 22 February 2016). 
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32(2) is an explicit invitation to do so, while leaving a variety of institutional choices to 
that legislature. 
4 CONCLUSION 
In a well-written and perceptive article that came to light after this article was accepted 
for publication, Raisa Cachalia has argued that the MVC case was an instance where the 
Constitutional Court as her title argues, “botched procedure and avoided substance”.  In 
her view, the Court should have reached the question of whether the Constitution gives 
South African citizens a right to know who funds our political parties.35  She 
persuasively argues that properly interpreted the subsidiarity principle did not apply to 
this case and that the Court should have reached the substantive issues.  Her article 
further addresses specifically the issue of section 167 and the separation of powers, 
which this article has largely left aside. 
The MVC case may be counted as a democratic opportunity missed.  The majority 
was incorrect to reason as it did with respect to the validity of PAIA and its relationship 
to section 32(2).  What is required are more creative arguments and thinking about how 
we deepen the character of the political conversation in our constitutional democracy, 
paying attention to institutional as well as adjudicative aspects.  We should retrieve the 
opportunity for a more limited but nonetheless significant dialogue involving the 
judiciary and legislature about the place of political parties in the South African 
democracy. 
 
35 Cachalia R, "Botching procedure, avoiding substance: a critique of the majority judgment in My Vote 
Counts" (2017) 33(1) SAJHR 138-153. 
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